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TIME VALUE OF MONEY AND INCOME TAX EVASION 
UNDER RISK-AVERSE BEHAVIOR: 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE· 
by 
STEVEN E. CRANE AND FARROKH NOURZAD** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the years since the 'Original work by Allingham and Sandmo [1972], income tax 
evasi'On has been analyzed extensively. Most of the w'Ork has been theoretical in 
nature. H'Owever, a number 'Of empirical studies have also appeared in the 
professional literature. This paper contains both types of analysis. From a 
theoretical perspective, we are interested in extending the traditi'Onal evasion 
framework so as to incorporate the possible effect of interest rates 'On a risk-averse 
individual's decisi'On t'O evade. Empirically, we attempt t'O provide, at an aggregate 
level, s'Ome evidence regarding the nature 'Of this relati'Onship, as well as the 
relati'Onship between evasi'On and its 'Other maj'Or determinants. 
Despite the extensive literature 'On tax evasi'On, little attenti'On has been given t'O 
the p'Ossible r'Ole 'Of interest rates. It is s'Omewhat surprising that this issue has n'Ot 
been pursued. It represents a natural extensi'On 'Of the simple dynamic m'Odel 
considered briefly by Allingham and Sandm'O [1972] in the final secti'On 'Of their 
seminal article. That m'Odel permitted them t'O establish that m'Ost 'Of the 
implicati'Ons 'Of their static m'Odel held in the dynamic case. But because 'Of its 
simplicity (e.g., the individual was assumed t'O have n'O time preference), they 
cauti'Oned that their dynamic results sh'Ould be c'Onsidered as tentative, and 
enc'Ouraged additi'Onal research in this area. 
As far as we kn'Ow, 'Only Spr'Oule, K'Omus, and Tsang [1980] and Rickard, Russell, 
and H'Owroyd [1982], have included interest rates in their m'Odels. While b'Oth 'Of 
these m'Odels provide valuable insights int'O the evasi'On problem, they are n'Ot 
primarily c'Oncerned with the role 'Of interest rates. The f'Ormer analyzes evasi'On 
under a negative inc'Ome tax system, while the latter f'Ocuses 'On the role 'Of 
retroactive penalties. Further, b'Oth c'Onsider the special case 'Of a risk-neutral 
individual. Thus, neither treatment of the role 'Of interest rates is c'Ompletely 
satisfact'Ory, and additi'Onal analysis is warranted. 
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On an intuitive level, it is easy to see how interest rates might affect the 
individual's assessment of the expected costs and benefits of evasion. Income that is 
successfu~y unreported can be invested in order to generate additional future 
income. Other things equal, this increases the return to successful underreporting, 
which, ignoring risk attitudes, should cause evasion to increase. On the other hand. 
the cost of unsuccessful evasion includes not only additional taxes and penalties, 
but also interest charges. Other things equal, higher interest rates increase the cost 
of unsuccessful evasion, and, ignoring risk considerations, should cause evasion to 
decrease. The individual's actual response depends on which of these two effects 
dominates,as well as on his/her attitude towards risk. 
Although the direction in which interest rates may affect tax evasion cannot be 
determined intuitively, certain insights may be gained from recognizing the 
possibility of tax avoidance and its probable interaction with tax evasion. Ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the interest rate may be expected to increase tax avoidance. 
This is because higher interest rates increase the return to avoidance without 
increasing the associated costs, since avoidance, a legal activity, is not subject to 
penalties. To the extent that avoidance and evasion are complementary, increased 
avoidance should be accompanied by increased evasion. However, if the two 
activities are substitutes, then no inference can be drawn regarding the effect of 
interest rates on tax evasion. 1 This underscores the need for a formal analysis of the 
effect of interest rates on income tax evasion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
develop a simple theoretical model of income tax evasion that explicitly considers 
the role of interest rates under risk-averse behavior. This is followed by Section III, 
where we specify and estimate an empirical evasion equation based on this 
theoretical model using time-series data for the U.S. In the final section, we 
summarize our findings. 
II. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
In developing our model of tax evasion, we follow the general framework 
suggested by Yitzhaki [1974]. This choice was influenced by the fact that in 
Yitzhaki's model penalties are based on evaded taxes, as is the current practice in 
the U.S.2 However, we modify Yitzhaki's model in three ways. First, in order to 
explicitly incorporate interest rates, we replace current income with permanent 
income, which we define as the present value of the lifetime stream of income. 
Second, we allow for the effect of inflation by including prices in the model. 3 To 
date, only Fishburn [1981] has considered this issue. Third, we specify the 
individual's decision variable in terms of the proportion oftrue income that is to be 
underreported, rather than the level of reported income as in Yitzhaki [1974]. This 
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allows us to compare our results with respect to the effect of interest rates and prices 
with those reported by Sproule, Komus, and Tsang [1980], and Fishburn [1981], 
respectively. 
Consider a risk-averse individual with a cardinal utility function, U. defined over 
the present value of real lifetime income, Q = !.(y,lp)( l+r)"', where y, is income in 
period t = O. 1 • .... n. p is the price deflator, and r is the individual's rate of time 
preference. Make the standard assumptions that U(Q) > o. U'(Q) > O. and U"(Q) < 
O. for all Q > O. The taxpayer faces an income tax rate, 0 < 8 < 1, and has to decide 
whether, and to what extent to evade taxes. If the taxpayer chooses to evade, he/she 
is assumed to underreport his/her true income by a constant fraction, A. The 
taxpayer's subjective assessment of the probability of getting caught is 0 < II < 1. 
Detected evaders are subjected to a penalty rate, 6> 1. which is imposed on evaded 
taxes. 
With probability II the evader will be detected, in which case hislher real income 
after taxes and penalties will be 
(I) ZI = !.(llp)[y , - 8(l-A)yJ(l+r)"' - 6!.(lIp)8Ay ,(l+r)", 
On the other hand, with probability (1 - II) the evader will go undetected and will 
enjoy real disposable income of 
(2) Z z = !.(llp)[y, - 8(1 - A)yJ(l + rT' 
The taxpayer chooses the proportion of income that is to be underreported, A, so 
as to maximize expected utility 
(3) E{U(Q)] = IIU(ZI) + (1 - II)U(Zl) 
Differentiating (3) with respect to A. and using (I) and (2), we get the necessary 
condition for an extremum 
(4) Off) = 8I( ~y'(l+r)"'[II(l-6)U'(ZI)+(l-II)U'(Zl)] = 0 
which can be written in an implicit form as 
(5) <l>(A, II, 6, 8, y. p. r) 
Differentiating (4) with respect to A, we obtain the sufficient condition for a 
maximum, 
(6) 
which is strictly negative under the previously stated assumptions. We have thus 
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established the existence of a unique solution to the taxpayer's optimization 
problem. 
Because we are interested in the comparative static implications of the model, it is 
essential to examine the restrictions that must be placed on its parameters in order 




(8) 6II < 1 
Moreover, we must have that 
(9) cJl( I. II,6,8,yr.p.r) = 8I(.1.)y,(l+rT'(II(1-6)U'{I(.1.)(y,86Yr)(l+rT'l 
P P 
which is satisfied as long as 
(10) 
+ (l-II)U'{I(.1.)Yr(l+rT'J) < 0 
P 
Note that the left-hand side of (10) is a (positive) fraction so that there is no 
contradiction with (8). Thus, (8) and (10) provide a set of conditions for the 
existence of a unique interior solution, AD, to the taxpayer's evasion problem. 
We are now in a position to conduct comparative static analysis of the effect of 
variations in the parameters of the model. Let us begin with the effect of the 
probability of detection, II. Differentiating (5) with respect to II using (4), and 
applying the Implicit Function Theorem (1FT) using (6), we have 
which is strictly negative, given (6) and the assumptions of the model. Thus, higher 
probabilities of detection result in a lower proportion of income underreported 
Let us next consider the effect of the other compliance policy tool, the penalty 
rate, 6. This requires differentiating (5) with respect to 6 using (4), and applying the 
1FT using (6) to get 
(12) ~~o = - (jy8III( ~)Yr(l+rTr{8A(6-I)I(-~)Yr(l+rT'ulI(ZI)-U'(Zl)] 
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which is strictly negative in view of (6) and the assumptions of the model. Thus, 
other things equal, higher penalty rates result in a lower proportion of income 
underreported. This result, along with that pertaining to the detection probability, 
is consistent with most models in the literature (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo 
[1972], Fishburn [1981], Srinivasan [1973]). 
Let us now examine the effect of the tax rate, 8, on >0.0• Differentiating (5) with 
respect to 8 using (4), and applying the 1FT using (6), we obtain 
where R.(Z) = - U"(Z) I U'(Z) is Arrow's [1971] measure of absolute risk aversion. 
Clearly, the sign of (13) depends on the sign of the second bracket. This is in line 
with Yitzhaki's [1974] finding that, when taxes are proportional and penalties are 
imposed on evaded taxes, changes in the tax rate generate only an income effect 
whose sign depends on the properties of the absolute risk aversion function. Since 
6>0. > O. under Arrow's Hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion, (13) is 
negative, implying that higher taxes lead to lower proportional underreporting. 
This, too, is consistent with Yitzhaki's finding that, ignoring the time value of 
money, higher tax rates result in higher levels of reported income. Note that 
Arrow's Hypothesis is only a sufficient condition for a negative relationship 
between the tax rate and the optimal proportion of income underreported. 
Turning to the effect of true income, y" we have that 
whereR,(Z) = - (U"(Z) I U'(Z)]Z is Arrow's [1971] measure of relative risk 
aversion. Under Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion, (14) is 
negative, implying that higher levels of true income lead to reduced proportional 
underreporting, ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with the finding of 
Allingham and Sandmo [1972] and Fishburn [1981], among others. Note that in 
this case Arrow's Hypothesis is both necessary and sufficient for the negative 
relationship between income and >0.0• 
Let us next consider the effect of inflation on >0.0. Differentiating (5) with respect 
to p using (4), and applying the 1FT using (6), we obtain 
Clearly, under Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion, (15) is 
unambiguously positive, indicating that higher prices lead to higher proportional 
underreporting. This is consistent with Fishburn's [1981] finding. 
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Finally, let us examine the effect of the variable which is of particular interest to 
us, the rate of interest, r. Differentiating (5) with respect to rusing (4), and applyin, 
the 1FT using (6), we.get 
Under Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion, (16) is positive, 
implying that higher interest rates lead to increased proportional underreportina. 
ceteris paribus. It is interesting to note that under the assumption of risk aversion 
we are able to obtain this conditional result. However, if risk neutrality is assumed, 
the partial derivative of AD with respect to r is sign ambiguous, as in Sproule, 
Komus, and Tsang [1980, p. 313]. 
To summarize, our simple model indicates the following. First, regardless ofthe 
properties of the risk aversion functions, there is an unambiguously negative 
relationship between optimal proportional underreporting, AD, and both the 
detection probability and the penalty rate. Second, if one is willing to subscribe to 
Arrow's Hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion, one would expect a 
negative relationship between AD and the tax rate. However, this hypothesis is only a 
sufficient condition for such a relationship. Third, under Arrow's Hypothesis of 
increasing relative risk aversion one would expect (i) a negative relationship 
between true income and AD, (ii) a positive relationship between inflation and AD, 
and (iii) a positive relationship between interest rates and AD. Note that here 
Arrow's Hypothesis is both a necessary and a sufficient condition. 
We are now in a position to conduct our empirical analysis. Where the theoretical 
results are unconditionally determinant, this empirical analysis should provide 
confirmation or refutation. Where the theoretical findings are conditional, we hope 
our empirical analysis will offer some insight into the nature of the relationships in 
question. 
III. AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Several problems are encountered when conducting aggregate empirical analysis 
of the effect of interest rates on evasion. First, it is difficult to obtain accurate 
measures of evasion since it is an unobserved phenomenon. Second, our focus on 
the effect of interest rates requires us to use time-series data, thereby limiting our 
choice of an evasion measure even further. Third, our interest in aggregate analysis 
poses not only the usual aggregation problems, but also the additional difficulty of 
aggregating risk aversion. 
Fortunately, these problems are not insurmountable. Despite the measurement 
problems, several attempts have been made to estimate the extent of tax evasion in 
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the U.S. These are reviewed and critically evaluated by Frey and Pommerehne 
[1982]. Of these measures some are time series spanning a period of sufficient 
length, thereby making them suitable for our purposes. Moreover, both 
aggregation problems can be overcome. First, aggregate counterparts of the 
arguments in (5) can be developed, as discussed in Appendix A. Second, the recent 
work by Szpiro [1983] provides a theoretical justification for the aggregation of risk 
aversion.· Therefore, a link can be established between the microfoundations laid 
out in the previous section and the aggregate analysis we wish to undertake. 
Based on the theoretical framework formulated in Section II, we specify 
the following aggregate empirical counterpart of the implicit evasion function given 
in (5) 
(17) A, = 00 + o/TI, + 016,· + oJ8, + 041nyt + oJp, 
+ 06', + 07 w, + 08 1 + E, 
where w is the wage and salary share of total income, 1 is an annual time index, the 
asterisk indicates that the corresponding variable has been instrumented as 
discussed in Appendix A, the dot represents proportionate rate of change, and all 
other notations are as defined in Section U.s 
Note that (17) differs from (5) in several ways. First, it contains an additional 
right-hand-side variable, w. This is included to allow for the fact that in the U.S. 
wage-and-salary income is difficult to conceal, due to tax information reporting by 
employers (see, for example, Clotfelter [1983] and Tanzi [1980]). Second, the 
income variable in (17) is expressed in logarithmic form in order to allow for 
nonlinearities that may arise from risk-averse behavior. Third, (17) is specified in 
terms of the rate of inflation, rather than the price level. Perhaps, a more consistent 
specification of the price variable would be to express it in logarithmic form. But 
given the specification of the income variable, this would cause severe 
multicollinearity problems. Although several econometric techniques for handling 
this problem are available, we do not believe the results could be as meaningfully 
interpreted. This means that no inference can be drawn from our theoretical model 
regarding the expected sign of the coefficient of p. 
Equation (17) was estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt second-order 
autoregressive procedure. The results are presented below, where the numbers in 
parentheses are 1- statistics. 
(18) >.., = 16.56 - 0.02 TI, - 0.076,· +0.07 8, - 0.10 Iny,· 
(6.00) (-0.53) (-4.16) ( 3.81) (-6.14) 
+ 0.68 p, + 0.66" - 0.09 w, - 0.34 1 
(9.79) (8.08) (-2.52) (-3.05) 
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iP = 0.92 
in = -0.45 . 
(-3.91) 
DW= 2.07 
in = -0.75 
(-6.51) 
It is evident from equation (18) that our model successfully captures the postulated 
aggregate evasion relationship. With one exception, all parameter estimates are 
statistically significant, and the adjusted Rl indicates that ninety-two percent oftbe 
overall variation in the proportion of income underreported has been explained by 
the model. 
Let us begin our discussion of the results with an examination of the interest rate 
variable. From (18) we see that interest rates are positively related to the proportion 
of income unreported, and that this relationship is statistically significant. Based on 
the coefficient of the rate of interest, a one percentage point increase in r results in 
more than 0.66 percentage point increase in proportional underreporting, A. This 
suggests that, other things equal, U.S. taxpayers have found, on average, that the 
expected gain from investing unreported income to be greater than the expected 
interest cost associated with unsuccessful evasion. This may be explained, at least in 
part, by the fact that in the U.S. penalties imposed on detected evaders are not fully 
retroactive.6 
The positive relationship between interest rates and underreporting also has an 
interesting implication for fiscal policy. It has long been argued that bond-financed 
fiscal policy generates higher interest rates which crowd out private spending. This 
makes fiscal policy less effective and adds to the deficit by increasing the interest 
cost of servicing the national debt. Our finding indicates that the deficit-induced 
higher interest rates lead, ceteris paribus, to more evasion, less tax revenue, and 
therefore a further increase in the deficit. In other words, tax evasion represents 
another channel through which the crowding-out effect adversely influences the 
budget. 
Next we consider our findings for the other variables in our empirical model. In 
general, we find significant coefficient estimates whose signs are consistent with our 
theoretical expectations or with previous empirical work. Both the penalty rate and 
the wage share variables are negatively related to the measure of evasion used here. 
However, the detection probability, while having the expected negative sign, is not 
statistically significant. This may be due to the failure of our proxy measure to 
adequately capture this inherently subjective variable. 
Turning to the effect of the tax rate, we find a direct relationship. This contrasts 
with our theoretical expectations, but it is consistent with the empirical finding 
reported by Clotfelter [1983], among others. A possible explanation for this direct 
relationship is as follows. While our simple theoretical model employs a 
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proportional tax function, our empirical model pertains to an economy with 
progressive taxes. With progressive taxes, changes in tax rates affect the labor-
leisure and saving-consumption decisions, producing both substitution and income 
effects. To the extent that the substitution effect dominates the income effect, 
higher taxes result in increased evasion. 
In the case of the income variable, a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient is obtained. This has an interesting implication. Recall from (14) that 
Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion is both necessary and 
sufficient for a negative relationship between income and underreporting. Further 
recall from (16) that this hypothesis is also necessary and sufficient for a positive 
relationship between interest rates and underreporting. Coupled with the above 
finding that interest rates and underreporting are positively related, our results with 
respect to income provide some support for the hypothesis of increasing relative 
risk aversion. 
As for the effect of changes in the inflation rate, our results indicate a positive 
link. This, too, has an interesting implication. It is often argued that because of the 
bracket-creep effect, inflation enhances tax revenue. However, in view of the 
positive relationship found here, the net effect of inflation on tax revenues may not 
be as significant as is generally believed. 
Finally, according to equation (18), proportional underreporting in the U.S. has 
had a negative trend over the period of study. Coupled with the fact that the level of 
aggregate unreported income has been rising over the same period, this finding 
means that in absolute terms, tax evasion has grown less rapidly than income. This 
is consistent with the above result that proportional underreporting falls as income 
rises. 
IV. SUMMARY 
In this paper we examined the effect of interest rates on tax evasion in the U.S. We 
began by developing a simple theoretical model which explicitly incorporated the 
role of interest rates under risk-averse behavior. In addition to interest rates, this 
model considered the effect on evasion of the probability of detection, the penalty 
rate, the tax rate, the level of true income, and the price level. 
Our comparative static analysis led to the conclusion that the direction of the 
relationship between interest rates and evasion depended upon attitude towards 
risk. Under the hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion advanced by Arrow, 
we found that a direct relation can be expected from interest rates to the proportion 
of income underreported. Results consistent with those reported in previous 
theoretical literature were obtained for the other variables. 
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To provide additional insight, we conducted an aggregate empirical analysis for 
the U.S. over the period 1947-81. The results indicated that evasion and interest 
rates were indeed directly related. The~ also supported previous empirical findinp 
regarding the relationship between evasion and its other major determinants. 
NOTES 
• This research was partially funded by a grant from Marquette University College of Businea 
Administration. We thank Professor Masatoshi A. Abe, whose comments in a Marquette Economics 
Department Seminar Works bop led to this research . 
•• The autbors are Assistant Professors of Economics at Marquette University, Milwaukee, USA. 
1 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the effect of interest rates on tax avoidance, 
and its possible implication for tax evasion. For a tbeoretical analysis oftbe interaction between income 
tax evasion and tax avoidance, see Cross and Shaw [1982]. 
2 Except for tbe penalty base, Yitzbaki's model is similar to tbat of Allingham and Sandmo [1972]. 
Like many evasion models, Yitzbaki's employs a number of simplifying assumptions. For example, il 
assumes a detection probability independent of income, as well as proportional tax and penalty 
functions. While these and other complexities could be incorporated into the model, (as in, for example, 
Fisbburn [1981], Koskela [1983], and Srinivasan [1973]), we have cbosen not to do so in order 10 keep 
tbe exposition simple. 
3 The rationale for inclUding the price level in a model of tax evasion is as follows. Price changes erode 
the real value of a given level of nominal disposable income, tbereby providing an incentive for the 
taxpayer to preserve his/her purchasing power through evasion. For more on this, see Fishburn [1981]. 
4 Although Szpiro's analysis is in terms of absolute risk aversion, it seems plausible that the same 
general conclusion holds for the case of relative risk aversion. This is a topic of current interest to the 
authors. 
S Note that (17) is a reduced-form equation. We chose that approach because our primary interest is in 
testing the interest rate-evasion hypothesis. Clearly, if one wished to trace the effect of tax evasion 
through the macro economy, one would have to employ an appropriat~ structural model. For a 
theoretical analysis of the general equilibrium effects of tax evasion, see Peacock and Shaw [19821, and 
Ricketts [1984]. 
6 In this case, the U.S . Tax Code provides for a statute of limitations of three to six years. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
In this appendix we develop the aggregate empirical counterparts of the arguments in (5) which are 
used in (17), provide the rationale for their selection, and indicate how we handle several potential 
econometric problems. 
PROPORTIONAL UNDERREPORTINO, A. Our analysis requircs aggregate time-serics data for the 
U.S. spanning a period of sufficient length. As far as we know, only two data serics meet tbis 
requiremeht: Tanzi's [1980] cstimates of evaded taxes and Park's cstimates of unreported income. 
Unfortunately, because the former estimatcs were obtained from an econometric model which included 
some of the explanatory variables used in (17), Tanzi's estimatcs cannot be used for our dependent 
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variable. Therefore, we base our dependent variable on Park's estimates of the Adjusted Gross InCODle 
(AGJ) Gap. 
The AG I Gap is the AG I figure derived by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from tbe Natiollal 
Income Accounts minus the AGI figure reported by the Ihternal Revenue Service (IRS). The former i .. 
proxy for reportable income while the latter is income actually reported to the tax authorities. Therefore, 
the Gap is a measure of the nondeclared income received in the official ("above ground") economy, and 
does not include "underground" income flows from criminal activity, etc. 
However, because the AGI Gap includes income of those not legally required to flIe tax returns, we 
adjust tbe Gap by removing from it an imputed value oftbe AGI ofthose not required to flIe tax returtll. 
To accomplish this, we follow an approach used by Goode [1976]. This involves using exemption data to 
estimate the percentage of the population not covered by tax returns, and assuming that tbe income of 
this group equals, on average, that reported on nontaxable returns. Tbe adjusted Gap is then expreaec! 
as a percentage of the income measure defined below. 
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION, II. Tbis variable is calculated as the moving average of the CUrrent, 
one-year, and two-year lagged values of the percentage of total tax returns audited each year by tbe IRS. 
The reason for using this moving average is as follows. An individual's subjective evaluation of tile 
probability of being detected may, in part, depend on wbether or not be/she knows someone wbo bu 
been audited recently. Tbis, in turn, is assumed to be a positive function ofthe percentage oftotal retuma 
audited. 
PENALTY RATE, 6. For this we use the ratio of the additional taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by 
the IRS during tbe year in question, to the amount of taxes evaded. This specification was chosen for two 
reasons. First, because the U.S. Tax Code specifies different fines for different types of offenses, no sinate 
statutory penalty figur~ can be used. Second, because this measure includes interest cbarges, it captures 
tbe effect of interest rates on the cost of evasion. Penalties are expressed as a percentage of evaded !aXel 
ratber than evaded income in order to be consistent witb tbe U.S. practice and witb our theoretica1 
model. Since tbe actual amount of evaded taxes depends on unreported income, the way this variable is 
constructed may introduce an error-in-variable bias. Tberefore, we follow Durbin's [1954] approach for 
constructing an instrumental variable. This involves ranking tbe sample in order of tbe variable 
measured with error and using this rank order as an instrument. 
TAX RATE, 8 . Here we use a weigbted average marginal tax rate constructed using a scbeme suggested 
by Wright [1969]. Tbis involves averaging tbe marginal rates in eacb year's tax schedule after weightin, 
them by tbe percentage of total AGI in tbe corresponding tax bracket. 
TRUE INCOME, y. Given that the dependent variable is based on tbe Adjusted AGI Gap, tbe 
appropriate measure of true income is BEA AGI adjustedforthe income of those not required toflletax 
returns. Because the inflation rate is included in the model as a separate variable, we specify true income 
in real terms. However, using Adjusted BEA AGI as an independent variable may result in simultaneity 
bias. Therefore, we instrument this variable by regressing it on all exogenous variables in the model, U 
well as the current and past values of the money stock (MI) and government expenditures. This means 
that (17) is estimated using the autoregressive analogue of the two-stage least squares procedure. 
INFLATION RATE, p. To measure inflation, we use tbe rate of change of the Consumer Price Index. 
We also used the Implicit GNP Deflator and obtained results consistent with those reported in (18). 
INTEREST RATE, r. Our measure of the rate of interest is an average of the savings and time deposit 
rate. Because the inflat ion rate enters equation (17) as a separate explanatory variable, the savings and 
time deposit rate was converted into real terms by removing from it the inflation rate as defined above. 
This allows us to capture the pure effect of interest rates on evasion. We also estimated (17) using tbe 
three-month Treasury Bill yield, which produced results comparable to those shown in (18). 
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WAGE AND SALARY SHARE, w. To control for the composition of income, we include the share of 
wages and salaries in national income as a separate variable in equation (17). 
APPENDIX B 
DATA SOURCES 
The data used in the construction of A, as well as y, were taleen from T.S. Parle, "The Relationship 
Between Personal Income and Adjusted Gross Income, 1947-78", SUrlley o/Current Business, November 
1981, pp. 24-28, and p. 46, as well as more recent volumes of the SlIrlIey o/Cllrrent Bllsiness. The data 
used for calculating n, and a, were obtained from Internal Revenue Service, Annllal Report: 
Commissioner 0/ IRS, U.S. Government Printing Office, tbe 1947-81 issues. Tbe data used for 
constructing 9, as well as the exemption data used to adjust the Gap were taleen from Internal Revenue 
Service, Statistics 0/ Income - Individual Returns, U.S. Government Printing Office, the 1947-81 issues. 
The data for all other variables were obtained from the Economic Report of the President, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1984. 
Summary: Time Value of Money and Income Tax Evasion Under Risk-averse Behavior: Theoretical 
Analysis and Empirical Evidence. - This paper examines the effect of interest rates on tax evasion. It 
begins by developing a simple theoretical model of a risle-averse individual whose evasion decision 
depends on the interest rate, tbe probability of detection, tbe penalty rate, tbe tax rate, the level of true 
income, and the price level. Comparative static analysis reveals that the direction of the relationship 
between interest rates and evasion depends upon altitude towards risle. Under Arrow's Hypotbesis of 
increasing relative risle aversion, it is determined that a direct relationsbip can be expected from interest 
rates to the proportion of income underreported. As for tbe other explanatory variables, results 
consistent with those reported in previous tbeoretical literature are obtained. In order to provide 
additional insight, empirical analysis of auregate U.S. data coveringtbe period 1947-81 is conducted. 
The results indicate tbat evasion and interest rates are indeed directly related. They also support 
previous empirical findings regarding the relationship between evasion and its other major 
determinants. 
Rkumr. LtJ valeur-temps de la monnaie et Nvasion de fimptlt sur Ie revenu SOlIS un comportement 
d' aversion au risque: analyse thlorique et Ividence empirique. - Cet article examine I'effet des taux 
d'inter~t sur I'evasion fiscale. II commence en developpant un mod~le theorique simple d'un individu 
adverse au risque dontla decision d'evasion depend du taux d'inte~t, de la probabilite de detection, du 
taux de pena1ite, du taux d'impl!t, du niveau du vrai revenu et du niveau des prix. L'analyse statique 
comparative indique que la direction de la relation entre les tau x d'inter~t et I'evasion depend de 
I'attitude envers Ie risque. Sous I'hypothhe d' Arrow d'une aversion relative croissante au risque, I'on 
determine que I'on peut s'attendre a une relation directe des taux d'inter~t a la proportion du revenu 
sous-evalue. En ce qui concerne les autres variables explicatives,l'on obtient des resultats analogues avec 
ceux mentionnk dans la litterature theorique anterieure. Afin de fournir des informations 
supplementaires, nous avons mene une analyse empirique des auregats relatifs aux Etats-Unis pour la 
periode 1947-1981. Ces rkultats indiquent que I'evasion et les taux d'ioteret sont effectivement 
directement relies. lis confirment aussi des resultats empiriques anterieurs a propos des relations entre 
I'evasion et des autres determinants majeurs. 
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Z __ me.f_a: Zeilliclter Wert des Geldes "lid EillkommellsteueTliermeidullg bei Ri.rikoabllnfUIII: 
TiteoretiJclte Allalyse "lid empirisc/te Evidellz. - Oer Artikel untersucht den Errekt von Zinsen aufSteu-
ervermeidung mittels cines einfachen theoretiscben Modclls mit einem risikobewuBten Individuum, dea-
sen Entscheidung zugtinsten der Steuervermeidunll von der HlIbe der Zinsen, der Wahrscheinlicbkeil 
der Aufdeckung, dem StrafmaB, dem Steuersatz, der HlIbe des tatsllchlichen Einkommens und dctn 
Preisniveau abhllnlll. Eine komparativ-statische Analyse zeilll, daB das Verhllltnis zwischen Zinsen unci 
Steuerhinterziehunll von der Einstellunll zum Risiko abbllnlll. Arrows Hypotbese der zunehmendcn re-
lativen Risikoabneiaunll deutet auf eine direkte Verbindunll zwiscben Zinsen und nicbt-erklllrtem Em. 
kommen hin. Hinsichtlich der anderen erkllirenden Variablen stimmen die Ergebnisse mit denen fr11ll. 
rer theoretischer Arbeiten Uberein. Oarilber binaus wird eine empirische Analyse auregimer US-Oalen 
fUr den Zeitraum 1947-81 durcblleCUbrt, die zu dcm Eraebnis kommt, daB Steuervermeidunll und Zilllell 
tatsllcblicb in direktem Zusammenbanll steben. Sie unterstreicbt frUbere empiriscbe Untersucbungen ina 
Hinblick auf das Verbllltnis zwiscben Steuervermeidunll und anderen wesentlicben Oeterminanten. 
